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"When life is so burdensome, death has become for man a sought-
after refuge."
-Herodotus (c. 485-c. 425 B.C.)1
"[M]ere living is not as good, but living well. Accordingly, the
wise man will live as long as he ought, not as long as he can. He
will mark in what place, with whom, and how he is to conduct his
existence, and not the quantity, of his life.... It is not a question
of dying earlier or later, but of dying well or ill. And dying well
means escape from the danger of living ill."
-Seneca, Epistula Morales.2
"To kill oneself to escape from poverty or love or anything else
that is distressing is not courageous but rather the act of a cow-
ard, because it shows weakness of character to run away from
hardships, and the suicide endures death not because it is a fine
thing to do but in order to escape from suffering."
-Aristotle, Ethics.
3
"God has reserved to Himself the right to determine the end of
life, because He alone knows the goal to which it is His will to lead
it. It is for Him alone to justify a life or cast it away."
-Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics.4
"I'm not afraid to die but I am afraid of this illness, what it's doing
to me. I'm not better. I'm worse. There's never any relief from it
now. Nothing but nausea and this pain.... Who does it benefit if
I die slowly? ... I'm stuck-stuck in life. I don't want to be here
anymore. I don't see why I can't get out."
-B. Rollin, Last Wish.
5
1 D. HUMPHRY & A. WicKETT, THE RIGHT TO DIE: AN HISTORICAL AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVE OF EuTHANAsIA, Dedication page (1986).
2 SENECA, EPIsTuLA MORALES ('On Suicide'), quoted in George P. Smith, II,
All's Well That Ends Well: Toward a Policy of Assisted Suicide or Merely Enlight-
ened Self-Determination?, 22 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 275 (1989).
3 ARISTOTLE, ETHICS 130, quoted in Daniel M. Crone, Historical Attitudes To-
ward Suicide, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 7, 14 (1996).
4 DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, ETHICS 168.
5 B. ROLLIN, LAST WISH, 149, 150, 170 (1985).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The cancer [Jack's tumor] had metastasized beyond control.
At the prescribed hour, a nurse would give Jack a shot of the
synthetic analgesic, and this would control the pain for perhaps
two hours or a bit more .... Then he would begin to howl, like a
dog. When this happened either he or I would ring for the
nurse, and ask for a pain killer. She would give him some
codeine or the like by mouth, but it never did any real good. [I]t
affected him no more than half an aspirin might affect a man
who had just broken his arm .... The third night of this rou-
tine a terrible thought occurred to me. "If Jack were a dog, I
thought, what would be done to him?" The answer was obvious,
the pound, and chloroform. No human being with a spark of
pity could let a living thing suffer so, to good end.6
Jack's case graphicly illustrates the inhumane suffering en-
dured by patients around the world. One would think the way
to improve the management of debilitating7 pain8 is to invest in
pharmacological and medical research that tediously analyzes
data from animal and human studies of various new drugs and
treatments. Such research would greatly contribute to develop-
ing better means of treating a patient's intractable pain. But
according to a project completed in 1996, sponsored by the
American Society of Law, Medicine, & Ethics ("ASLME"), the
next frontier for treating pain may not involve new drugs, but
rather new law and regulatory policies. 9
6 Lori D. Pritchard Clark, Rx: Dosage of Legislative Reform to Accommodate
Legalized Physician-Assisted Suicide, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 689, 689 (1994).
7 The term "debilitating" is used to describe pain which impairs the strength
of the individual, to weaken as in to reduce in intensity or effectiveness. WEB-
STER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 328 (9th ed. 1986).
8 See AMERICAN COLLEGE OF LEGAL MEDICINE, LEGAL MEDICINE THIRD EDI-
TION 536 (3d ed. 1995). "Pain", defined by Dr. John Bonica, is "an unpleasant sen-
sory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage or
described in terms of such damage." Id.
9 American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics, The Project on Legal Con-
straints on Access to Effective Pain Relief Findings, Boston, MA (1997). The Pro-
ject is funded by the Mayday Fund and the Emily Davie and Joseph S. Kornfield
Foundation. See id. The principal investigators on the project were leading schol-
ars in the fields of law, bioethics and medicine including: Robert Levine, Professor
of Medicine and Lecturer in Pharmacology, Yale University School of Medicine;
Nancy Dubler, Director, Division of Bioethics, Montefiore Medical Center; and
Sandra H. Johnson, Professor of Law, Center for Health Law Studies, St. Louis
University Schools of Law, Medicine and Public Health. See id.
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ASLME established the Project on Legal Constraints to Ac-
cess to Effective Pain Relief (the "Project") in response to the
recognized problem of health care providers' failure to ade-
quately treat pain experienced by patients. 10 The Project pro-
duced a model Pain Relief Act 1' giving providers who prescribe
pain treatment a defense if disciplinary or criminal action is ini-
tiated against them by state medical boards or prosecutors, un-
less clinical expert testimony establishes that the health care
provider did not substantially comply with accepted practice or
care-giving guidelines for pain management. 12
The project was timely, given the current national policy
debate surrounding the legalization of physician-assisted sui-
cide and the emerging role of pain management. 13 The parame-
ters of this debate not only include the legal aspects-civil,
criminal and disciplinary-but also a discussion of the most ef-
ficacious remedies for pain and an exploration of how health
care providers, payers and the legal system should respond to
the problem of under-treatment. Numerous articles have been
written dissecting the multitude of decisions handed down by
all levels of state and federal courts on the issue of physician
assisted suicide ("PAS").14 However, few of these decisions,
10 See id.
11 The full text of the Act follows at Appendix A.
12 See id.
13 AMERICAN COLLEGE OF LEGAL MEDICINE, supra note 8, at 534. "Pain man-
agement", a new specialty in the field of medicine, developed like so many treat-
ments do, out of patient need. See id. Acute pain sufferers, often accused of
dependence on pain medicine, eventually convinced the establishment of their
plight. See id. As reward for their diligence, guidelines* eventually evolved to help
direct the medical community in treating this unfortunate occurrence. See id. Un-
fortunately, many patients before and still today suffer due to "inadequate [pre-
scription ofil analgesic medications." See id.
* These guidelines were promulgated in U.S. DEPr. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV-
ICES, ACUTE PAINE MANAGEMENT: OPERATIVE OR MEDICAL PROCEDURES IN TRAUMA
(1992).
14 See, e.g., Ronald Scott Kuniak, European Perspectives Towards Euthanasia
and Physician-Assisted Suicide, 9 N. Y. INT'L. L. REV. 85 (1996); John Hodgson,
Comparative Health Law: Rights of the Terminally Ill Patient, 5 ANN. HEALTH L.
169 (1996); Stephanie Graboyes-Russo, Too Costly To Live: The Moral Hazards of
a Decision in Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV.
907 (1997); C. Ann Potter, Esq., Will the "Right to Die" Become a License to Kill?
The Growth of Euthanasia in America, 19 J.-LEGIS. 31 (1993); George J. Annas,
The "Right to Die" in America: Sloganeering From Quinlan and Cruzan to Quill
and Kevorkian, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 875 (1996).
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most of which disallow the practice of PAS, address the pa-
tient's right to proper treatment for intractable pain 15 given
that they cannot legally end their lives. Furthermore, courts
give the medical community little direction on how to best ad-
minister palliative care 16 without crossing the ambiguous lines
drawn in the controlled substance legislation and regulations.
While buzz words such as "palliative care", "pain manage-
ment", and "intractable pain" float around legislative chambers,
policy think tanks, and medical association ethics committees,
many patients are suffering horrible pain with no relief in
sight.' 7 This is not because medicine has not advanced to the
point where it can alleviate such pain, but rather because the
law has not so advanced. In failing to find resolution in the
American legal system as of yet, individuals find themselves
turning elsewhere for answers.
Section I of this looks at the British system of law regard-
ing the regulation of controlled substances used in the treat-
ment of intractable pain and the role these substances play in
the ongoing debate over physician assisted suicide and the right
to live and die in comfort. Section II sketches the American
background against which the reader should examine the Brit-
ish legal and philosophical approaches to this problem. The
reader must appreciate that while the debate over the right to
15 Statutes and case law fail to succinctly define the condition referred to
throughout this article as "intractable pain." While definitions for "acute" and
"chronic" pain are available, the medical community has yet to put into words this
subjective and personal experience. See AMERICAN COLLEGE OF LEGAL MEDICINE,
supra note 8, at 536, 537. See also Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d.
790 (9th Cir. 1996) (the court in several instances refers to the pain as protracted,
undignified and extreme). See, e.g., VETERANS ADMINISTRATION POLICY GUIDE-
LINES, Nov. 18, 1991, M-2, pt. I, ch. 31, para. 31.02, at 31-2. Some policies, as
exemplified in guidelines for Veterans Administration hospitals have such great
elasticity that even individuals whose conditions are solely related to arthritis or
mental illness could fall within the category of terminally ill. This would allow
removal of life sustaining treatments such as food and fluids, under certain cir-
cumstances. Veterans Administration Hospital Guidelines have defined "terminal
illness" to include "chronic debilitating conditions from which there is no reason-
able hope of recovery." Id.
16 Palliative care is medical treatment, of various kinds, which serves to re-
duce the violence of or to moderate the intensity of the pain suffered by a patient.
See WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 848 (9th ed. 1986).
17 Annas, supra note 14, at 888. Ninety percent of Americans would choose
not to continue medical treatment if in a Persistent Vegetative State ("PSV"). See
id. See also Pritchard, supra note 6.
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die or to live is not a new one, it is an evolving one. The recent
decisions rendered by the Supreme Court, the continuing tech-
nological and medical advancements and renewed popularity of
religion have propelled this issue back into the forefront of
debate.
Section III addresses how and why individuals with intrac-
table pain find themselves following what they feel is the only
path to relief, death. The anguish and distress endured by such
individuals, whom the reader will meet in Section III, help en-
lighten the reader about suffering most of us, God willing, will
never experience. Section IV examines how this suffering is for-
mally addressed through Health Care Systems.
Section V discusses the British legal system regarding the
treatment of intractable pain. Specifically, this section looks at
the criminalization of prescribing controlled substances by li-
censed professionals to treat debilitating pain. This section ex-
amines the premise and history for such laws and the effect on
the patients of the medical practitioners reigned in by them.
Concluding is examination of the significance of these criminal
laws on individuals suffering from under-treated or completely
un-treated debilitating pain. Partly because of this restrictive
prescription system, medical practitioners are forced to choose
between under-treating their patients and breaking the law.
Patients are left with even more daunting decisions, continue to
suffer or look for another way out. The author intends that by
broadly examining the British system, this article offers gui-
dance and direction to those bearing the weighty responsibility
of balancing an individual's right to be free from pain with the
state's interest in protecting the public.
II. A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO RELIEF:
THE AMERICAN BACKDROP
Inside the space of a month, two United States Courts of
Appeal struck down long-standing state laws in Washington
and New York. An eight to three majority of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, I8 and a three judge
panel in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
18 See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 838.
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cuit,19 found state laws forbidding physicians to aid or abet
their patient in acts of suicide 20 unconstitutional. Within a vir-
tual blink of an eye, a seemingly unshakable consensus sup-
porting criminalization of PAS within the medical profession,
the judiciary, the bioethics community, and the general public
had been unceremoniously overturned. The United States
Supreme Court restored this consensus in June of 1997 in two
equally controversial holdings. 21
A. Compassion in Dying: The Ninth Circuit's View
Judge Stephen Reinhardt, writing for a majority of an en
banc decision of the Ninth Circuit,22 held that competent, termi-
nally ill patients have a powerful "liberty interest," what used
to be called a Constitutional right, to enlist the aid of their phy-
sician in hastening death via prescriptions for lethal drugs.23
He reasoned that just as the right to privacy guarantees women
the right to choose an abortion, this liberty interest protects the
right to choose the time and manner of one's death.24
Judge Reinhardt, in response to warnings against the ex-
pansion of this right to broader categories of patients (for exam-
ple, to the mentally incapacitated) and against the great
likelihood of mistake and abuse, permitted the regulation of
PAS to avoid such evils. However, he pointedly ruled out any
and all blanket prohibitions. 25 Judge Reinhardt, responding to
the traditional objections that allowing PAS would subvert the
state's interests in preventing suicide and maintaining the in-
tegrity of the medical profession, contended that our society al-
19 Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 731 (2d Cir. 1996).
20 See id. See also Clark, supra note 6, at 701. The American Medical Associ-
ation ("AMA") has taken the position that mercy killing, or the intentional termi-
nation of the life of one human being by another is prohibited. See id.
Interestingly, the AMA also condones the cessation of life-sustaining treatment as
morally justifiable. See id.
21 Vacco v. Quill, 117 S.Ct. 2293 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct.
2258 (1997).
22 See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d. at 790.
23 See id. at 816.
24 See id. at 813-14. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Court
protects a constitutional right to abortion under certain circumstances enunciated,
and subsequently revised by the court).
25 See Compassion in Dying, at 816-32, 836-37 (reviewing state interests and
illustrating the application of the balancing test and holding).
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ready has effectively erased the distinction between merely
allowing patients to die and killing them.26 Reinhardt claimed
that by allowing patients or their surrogates to forgo life-sus-
taining medical treatments, including artificially administered
nutrition and hydration, and by sanctioning the administration
of pain-killing drugs that might also hasten death, our society
already permits a variety of "death inducing" practices. 27 Thus,
the social risks of allowing PAS are only different in degree, not
in kind, from risks that we already countenance.
B. Second Circuit Uses Quill and Ink in Support of PAS
Writing for the Second Circuit and striking down a similar
New York statute, Judge Roger J. Miner explicitly rejected the
claim of the Second Circuit majority that a "substantive due
process" right of PAS exists in the Constitution.28 He conceded
that the Supreme Court is unlikely to extend the boundaries of
the so-called right to privacy, but found nevertheless that the
statute violated the equal protection clause of the Constitu-
tion.29 Echoing Judge Reinhardt's opinion in Compassion in
Dying, Judge Miner observed that New York's law30 allowed
some people relief from the ravages of terminal illness (i.e.,
those connected to some form of removable life-support) but de-
nied relief to those not so connected, for whom PAS was the only
remaining exit.31 Concurring with Judge Reinhardt's assertion
that the social risks of PAS are identical to those of our more
socially approved "death inducing" practices, Judge Miner con-
cluded that this kind of differential treatment serves no legiti-
mate state purpose.3 2 Thus, he held that the New York law was
unconstitutional even in the absence of a new fundamental
right to PAS. 33
26 See id. at 822-23.
27 Compassion id., at 804. See generally Clark, supra note 6, at 705-09 for a
concise overview of the laws of PAS.
28 See Quill, 80 F.3d at 724-25.
29 See id.
30 See id. at 727-29. See also NY Penal Law §§ 120.30 and 125.25, subd. 3
(McKinney's 1986) (the sections of the penal law defining manslaughter and sui-
cide in New York State).
31 See Quill, 80 F.3d. at 716.
32 See id. at 726.
33 See id. at 727.
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C. States' Rights Reign Supreme
In June of 1997, however, the Supreme Court reversed the
Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill decisions and up-
held the statutes criminalizing PAS. 34 It ruled that individuals
have no constitutional right to assistance in committing sui-
cide. 35 The court disposed of the due process 36 and equal pro-
tection 37 analysis proffered in support of such a right but did
not foreclose legalization of PAS as a matter of state law.38
Moreover, the court expressed two somewhat divergent ideas:
"That there is no constitutional right to physician assistance to
hasten one's death, and that the resolution may ultimately lie
in changing medical policies toward treating pain in the termi-
nally ill."3 9
This unexpected finding of a constitutional right to pallia-
tive care will have a wide impact on the treatment of not only
the terminally ill but also those suffering from chronic intracta-
ble pain. Legal authorities40 are relying on the Justices' sugges-
tion that palliative care may be a constitutional right.41
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg and O'Connor stated "judicial inter-
vention would be necessary 'were state law to prevent the provi-
sion of palliative care, including the administration of drugs as
needed to avoid pain at the end of life.' '4 2 Justice Breyer fur-
ther stated that "It]he laws before us ... do not prohibit doctors
from providing patients with drugs sufficient to control pain de-
spite the risk that those drugs themselves will kill .... [Were
state laws to prevent the provision of palliative care, . . . the
34 See Vacco, 117 S.Ct. at 2293; Washington, 117 S.Ct. at 2258.
35 See Vacco, 117 S.Ct. at 2297; Washington, 117 S.Ct. at 2269-71.
36 See Washington, 117 S.Ct. at 2267.
37 See Vacco, 117 S.Ct. at 2297.
38 See Vacco, 117 S.Ct. at 2302; Washington, 117 S.Ct. at 2258, 2272-75.
39 Alexandra Dylan Lowe, Facing the Final Exit, ABA JOURNAL, Sept. 1997 at
48, 50-51.
40 Robert Burt, Op. Ed. Article, NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE (Sept.
1997). Robert Burt, Yale Law Professor and member of the Project on Death in
America's advisory board, stated that "[tihe court has, in effect, said that the states
are not authorized to impede the access of terminally ill persons to pain relief." Id.
See generally Diane M. Gianelli, A Constitutional right to Pain Control? Ruling on
Assisted Suicide May Have Wider Impact, AMERICAN MEDICAL NEWS 3 (November
10, 1997).
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court might have to revisit its conclusions in these cases."43 Fi-
nally, Justice Souter added that "[s]tates that refuse to address
obstructive elements in their law are guilty of 'legislative foot
dragging." 44
The effects of the holdings in Vacco v. Quill and Washing-
ton v. Glucksberg have yet to be felt. For the purposes of this
article it is important to remember this new "fundamental
right" to palliative care in grasping the different approaches to
pain management around the world. An underlying reverence
for human life exists in both the state and federal jurisdictions
this article addresses. 45 However each society faces unique
challenges from religious, economic, social and even tribal
fronts and all must be addressed by the one system of law-the
ultimate authority in each jurisdiction.
III. DEATH: THE ONLY PATH TO RELIEF
In Great Britain and in the United States, patient testimo-
nials have proven time and again that patients suffering from
intractable pain from terminal illness and chronic conditions
see death as the only path to relief. Strong evidence of this the-
ory is found in the popularity of doctors in the United States,
such as Dr. Kevorkian, who have helped individuals commit su-
icide at the patient's request. 46 The trend in Great Britain is no
different. One of the many moving stories brought before legis-
lative bodies here and abroad is the struggle of Ms. Annie Lind-
sell.4 7 Ms. Lindsell, a British citizen, suffered from motor
neuron disease ("MND"), a degenerative neurological condi-
43 See id.
44 See id.
45 Each jurisdiction's criminal laws grew out of Christian doctrines venerating
human life.* For example, the release of Pope John Paul II's encyclical on human
life, in which the Pope "restate[d] in the strongest terms the [C]hurch's opposition
to abortion and euthanasia, urged conscientious objection to laws that permit
them, and issued a ringing rejection of the death penalty." Bob Keeler, Papal
Creed: Restating Opposition to Abortion, Death Penalty and Euthanasia, NEWS-
DAY, Mar. 31, 1995, at A5.
* See generally Crone, supra note 3; Herbert Hendin, The Slippery Slope: The
Dutch Example, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 427 (1996).
46 No Legal Action is Anticipated as Kevorkian Suicides Multiply, WASH.
POST, Aug. 24, 1996, at A2.
47 See UNITED KINGDOM HOUSE OF LORDS, ANSWERS TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS,
HOME DEPARTMENT, Tuesday, July 22, 1997.
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tion.48 The most inhumane manifestation of this disease occurs
when the body, while maintaining the ability to feel pain, slowly
loses its motor control. Many late stage MND patients suffer
the indescribable fate of choking on their own mucus while try-
ing to eat.49 Ms. Lindsell feared the same agonizing death for
herself, having become quite close to many such patients
through treatment and support groups.50
These philosophical reflections can be understood in light of
a more clinical perspective addressing to the motivational fac-
tors behind many requests to die. Many people advocate legali-
zation of PAS because they fear a loss of control at the end of
their lives. They fear falling victim to the technological impera-
tive; they fear dying in chronic and uncontrolled pain; they fear
the psychological suffering attendant upon the relentless disin-
tegration of the self; they fear, in short, a bad death. All of
these fears, it so happens, are eminently justified. Statistics
show physicians routinely ignore the documented wishes of pa-
tients and all too often allow patients to die in uncontrolled
pain.5 ' Furthermore, many researchers have found that uncon-
trolled pain, particularly when accompanied by feelings of hope-
lessness and untreated depression, is a significant contributing
factor for suicide and suicidal ideation. 52
IV. HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS
Both the British and American health care systems incor-
porate the safeguard requirement that a physician, prior to pro-
viding life-terminating assistance, inform the patient of the
48 See id.
49 See id.
50 See generally Clark, supra note 6. See also United Kingdom House of
Lords, Answers to Written Questions, supra note 47. The House of Lords discussed
at length the government's approach to palliative care. See id. The Lords dis-
cussed such policy in light of the case of Annie Lindsell. See id. Ms. Lindsell at-
tempted to get the court's permission to commit physician-assisted suicide. See id.
Her request was denied. See id.
51 See A Controlled Trial to Improve Care for Seriously Ill Hospitalized Pa-
tients: The Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks
of Treatments (SUPPORT), 274 JAMA 1591, 1591-92 (Nov. 22, 1995).
52 See id. at xiv.
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availability of health care alternatives.53 They also require that
a patient receive psychiatric care, when found necessary, prior
to qualification for euthanasia assistance.54 Although all the
systems express concern that the patient be informed of the
availability of health care options and require utilization of
some alternative health care services, no system coordinates a
guarantee that information on availability of other health care
alternatives ensures geographic and financial access to health
care alternatives.
A. Access to Health Care
Health care systems in Great Britain and the United States
vary. Most notably, Britain has universal access to health
care. 55 In contrast, the United States is one of the few remain-
ing industrialized countries without universal access to health
care. 56 Universal coverage does not guarantee immediate ac-
cess but does guarantee eventual access. 57
By contrast, the United States generally guarantees imme-
diate access only for emergency care and only limited access for
uninsured routine care when the patient lacks the resources to
pay.5 8 When access is gained, the uninsured are likely to receive
a lower level of health care services.59 Furthermore, uninsured
patients have less access to preventative and non-emergency
care that can often eliminate or shorten periods of pain and ill-
ness.60 With increasing financial pressure being placed on hos-
pitals and physicians, access and level of health care service for
the uninsured face increasing compromise. 61
53 See Roger S. Magnusson, The Sanctity of Life and the Right to Die: Social
and Jurisprudential Aspects of the Euthanasia Debate in Australia and the United
States, 6 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1 (1997).
54 See id.
55 See P.D.G. SKEGo, LAW, ETHICS, AND MEDICINE: STUDIES IN MEDICAL LAW
144 (1984).
56 See EDWARD M. MENDOZA & BRYN J. HENDERSON, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH
CARE: A FRAMEWORK FOR COMPARING NATIONAL HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS 7-8 (1995).
57 See id. at 8.
58 See id. at 8-9.
59 See Tom Stacy, The Courts, The Constitution, and a Just Distribution of
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When a system permitting euthanasia requires that the
physician inform the patient of other health care alternatives,
of what benefit is the information if access to the other alterna-
tives is not available? In the United States, an estimated
thirty-seven million people are uninsured. 62 "Although those
greater than 65 years of age and the very poor have access to
good coverage, there are increasing numbers of working poor
without coverage. Access difficulty is increasing for poor, black,
Hispanic, or underinsured citizens."63
B. Access to Palliative Care
Palliative care, as a health care alternative, is experiencing
increased success in alleviating pain and providing comfort to
patients with a limited life expectancy diagnosis.64 A 1986 na-
tional hospice study of home-care, hospital-based hospices, and
conventional care revealed that a respective ten, four, and
eighteen percent of patients experienced persistent pain.65 In
contrast, a 1973 report indicated that seventy-three percent of
patients experienced persistent pain.66 Although palliative care
is improving, there are several barriers to its increasing overall
access: fifty countries do not have access to medicinal mor-
phine, few medical schools offer palliative care in the curricu-
lum, and physicians fear the legal ramifications of medicating
for pain. 67
The United States does not guarantee access to medical
treatment. 68 Absent such access to alleviate pain, information
about palliative care as a health care alternative is of little use
to a patient who is enduring a painful illness. The British have
62 See THOMAS S. BODENHEIMER & KEVIN GRUMBACH, UNDERSTANDING
HEALTH POLICY: A CLINICAL APPROACH 19 (1995).
63 MENDOZA & HENDERSON, supra note 56, at 8.
64 See Warren L. Wheeler, Hospice Philosophy: An Alternative to Assisted Su-
icide, 20 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 755, 757 (1994).
65 See id.
66 See id.
67 See id. at 757-58.
68 See JOHN A. ROBERTSON, THE RIGHTS OF THE CRITICALLY ILL 146-53. The
area of costs and allocation of scarce resources in medical care is unclear. While
doctors and hospitals do have some responsibility to treat patients regardless of
their ability to pay, this treatment is generally mandatory in emergency situations
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established palliative care as a component of their national
health care system.69
In contrast, the American system does not guarantee access
to palliative care. 70 Palliative care is not, however, new to the
health care continuum in the United States; since 1978, the Na-
tional Hospice Organization has advocated the needs of the ter-
minally ill. 7 1 "In the 1990s, annual growth in the number of
hospice patients nationwide has averaged 13 percent. '72 How-
ever, Medicare and Medicaid public assistance programs, avail-
able only to select portions of the population, continue to pay for
over seventy-five percent of all hospice care provided. 73 Access
is further limited when a patient is a member of a minority
race,74 does not have a primary caregiver, 75 or requires "high
tech" therapies. 76
If the overriding purpose of a system of euthanasia is to
provide the final alternative on a continuum of patient auton-
omy, how can it fulfill its purpose without providing access to
other health care alternatives? How can information about al-
ternative services provide comfort and dignity to a patient when
those services are not available? Information alone does not
permit a patient to effectively choose between enduring a dete-
riorating, painful, and perhaps slow death and a quick death
that at a minimum ensures an end to an unknown future. A
system that permits voluntary euthanasia cannot equally guar-
69 See UNITED KINGDOM HOUSE OF LORDS, supra note 47.
70 See ROBERTSON, supra note 68, at 14-15, 146-53.
71 See NATIONAL HOSPICE ORGANIZATION, HOSPICE FACT SHEET (1996) London,
England. Hospice care is provided to a patient with a limited life expectancy of six
months or less. See id.
72 Id.
73 See id. Sources of payment for hospice services are as follows: Medicare,
66.8%; private insurance, 14.6%; Medicaid, 9.1%; indigent (non-reimbursed) care,
6.3%; other, 3.2%. See id.
74 See NATIONAL HOSPICE ORGANIZATION, HOSPICE FACT SHEET (1996). Consis-
tent with other health care census statistics, 85% of hospice patients were white;
9% were African American; 3% were Hispanic; and 3% were identified as 'other'.
See id.
75 See id. Forty-five percent of hospices admit patients without primary
caregivers; another 31% admit patients without caregivers on a case-by-case basis.
See id.
76 See id. Fifty-one percent of hospices admit individuals requiring 'high-tech'
therapies; an additional 42% admit patients needing 'high-tech' services on a case-
by-case basis. See NATIONAL HOSPICE ORGANIZATION, HOSPICE FACT SHEET (1996).
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antee the right to live and the right to die without a guarantee
of alternative health care.
V. THERE OUGHT To BE A LA W. LEGALITY OF PAIN
MANAGEMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN
A. All in a Day's Work: The Doctor's Duty
English law, in this author's view, is very similar to that of
the United States. However, before setting out the law, it is
important to delineate to what extent there exists any unifying
principle or premise, which draws together the individual legal
rules. Such a principle would not only add rational coherence to
what would otherwise be a set of unrelated rules, but would also
supply the reference point whereby novel dilemmas may be re-
solved. One such principle, often referred to in the United
States, is that of contract-that the relationship between the
doctor and the patient is regulated by agreement between the
two parties. 77 This is not unifying for a number of reasons.
First, in England there is not, as a matter of law, a contract
between doctor and patient in the vast majority of all relation-
ships, because health care is made available through the Na-
tional Health Service. 78 Second, the notion of a contract carries
the implication that medical care is a commodity to be bar-
gained for in the market-place, and available only if the price is
right, a notion specifically rejected in England.79
77 See AMERICAN COLLEGE OF LEGAL MEDICINE, supra note 8, at 62-63. Dr.
John Bonica states "[tihe physician-patient relationship is based on a contract that
creates a fiduciary relationship between the parties, and in which the physician
impliedly promises the patient that he or she will exercise that degree of skill ordi-
narily possessed by his or her colleagues and practice according to accepted stan-
dards." Id.
78 See JONATHAN MONTGOMERY, HA TH CARE LAw 54-55 (Oxford, 1997).
While central government has not articulated the specific goals of the National
Health Service, they are primarily defined under the National Health Service Act
of 1977. See id. "[Such act] obliges the Secretary of State to promote ' a compre-
hensive health service designed to secure improvement--a) in the physical and
mental health of the people of [England and Wales], and (b) in the prevention,
diagnosis and treatment of illness.'" Id.
79 See European Social Charter, 1961, Art. 13 and pt. I, rights 11 and 13. The
United Kingdom, under human rights law, recognizes a right to health care. See
id. Specifically, "everyone has the right to benefit from any measures enabling him
to enjoy the highest standard of health attainable . . . [and] anyone without ade-
quate resources has the right to social and medial assistance." Id.
1998]
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Another unifying principle is said to be the concept of trust.
Trust, it is said, is the key factor governing the doctor-patient
relationship.80 This analysis is equally flawed. First, to argue
that each party must trust the other does not demonstrate in
fact that each does. Indeed, oftentimes a doctor may expect
trust without himself reciprocating. For example, the doctor
will choose not to tell his patient certain facts, on the paternal-
istic premise that the patient is better off not knowing.8 ' Sec-
ond, trust presupposes a conscious and reasoned decision by the
patient which, in fact, may be beyond many patients who,
through pain or the effect of pain killing drugs, cannot make
sound decisions.8 2
If there is a unifying premise guiding the law, it is the con-
cept of duty. A doctor has expertise. More often than not, the
patient lacks such expertise and, therefore, stands in a more
vulnerable position. He can only rely on the doctor's skill and
good faith. Given this reality, the law imposes duties upon the
doctor existing independently of agreement. The patient may
expect and ultimately demand that these duties be carried
out.
8 3
One of the many duties doctors owe to terminally ill pa-
tients and patients suffering from intractable pain is to make
the patient comfortable, which includes pain management.8 4
80 See AMERICAN COLLEGE OF LEGAL MEDICINE, supra note 8, at 62-63, 119.
The contract between the parties and the nature of the duty of care of the doctor to
the patient are fiduciary in nature. See id.
81 See id. at 278. The doctrines of informed consent and disclosure developed
to help erode this paternalistic attitude of doctors toward patients as well as to
help protect both parties from misunderstandings regarding diagnosis and treat-
ment. See id.
82 See id. at 282. Dr. John Bonica stated "[c]onsent must be given by a patient
who is mentally and physically capable of comprehending the information provided
by the physician . . .and capable of making a decision concerning the course of
treatment. The physical effects of pain and medication must not be so great as to
diminish the patient's mental abilities to comprehend the consent process." [empha-
sis added]. Id. See also B. v. Croydon Health Authority [1995] 1 All E.R. 683;
Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Robb [1995] 1 All E.R. 677; Aire-
dale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] 1 All E.R. 821.
83 In tort actions at common law, a duty of doctor toward patient exists, i.e.
medical malpractice. See AMERICAN COLLEGE OF LEGAL MEDICINE, supra note 8, at
129-39.
84 Doctors swearing to uphold the Hippocratic Oath swear in part to"... fol-
low that system of regimen which, according to my ability and judgment, [he/she]
consider for the benefit of my patients ..... " The Oath continues, "I will give no
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There may arise circumstances in which a doctor may use a
form of treatment for his or her patient's benefit, aware of the
fact that it may have the secondary effect of accelerating (or run
the risk of accelerating) the patient's death. This reflects the so-
called doctrine of double effect,85 incorporated in English law in
one of the few cases that have been decided in this area, R v.
Bodkin Adams. 6 The doctor is not in breach of his legal duty to
his patient if, by adopting the particular form of treatment, his
principal and primary intention is the alleviation of symptoms,
which are discomforting and irremediable in any less drastic
way.
deadly medicine to anyone if asked, nor suggest any such counsel; .. " THE HIP-
POCRATIC OATH reprinted in J.K. MASON AND R.A. Mc CALL SMITH, LAw AND MEDI-
CAL ETHics, appendix A (Butterworth & Co. 1984). In circumstances such as those
presented here, these two separate affirmations may very well directly contradict
each other.
85 See Rita L. Marker & Wesley J. Smith, The Art of Verbal Engineering, 35
DUQ. L. REV. 81. The "Principle of Double Effect" provides that it is permissible to
perform an act that has both a good effect and a bad effect only if all of the follow-
ing conditions are met:
The act to be done must be good in itself or at least indifferent;
The good effect must not be obtained by means of the bad effect;
The bad effect must not be intended for itself but only permitted; and
There must be a proportionately grave reason for permitting the bad
effect.
Id. at 105, FN 113.
86 R. v. Bodkin Adams [1957] Crim. L.R. 365. J. Devlin's analysis in this case
seems to have two strands. See id. First, the doctor in administering drug therapy
does not intend the patient's death. See id. But in knowing that such therapy may
hasten the patient's death and that such death will probably follow, he/she intends
the death although may not desire it. See id. Second, the analysis may be that the
doctor does not cause the death at all; the patient dies from the underlying illness.
See id.
Regardless, J. Devlin's analysis and charge to the jury resulted in the proposi-
tion that a doctor may lawfully commit an act whereby he intentionally causes the
death of a patient in circumstances which the law (the courts, mind you, not Par-
liament) thinks permissible, as a matter of public policy. Adams, [19571 Crim. L.R.
365. The specific circumstances must be analogous to those here, where the life in
question and the illness/condition ravaging the body with pain makes such a life
intolerable. See id.
17
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B. Underlying Legal Theories of Murder, Manslaughter and
Assisted Suicide
Doctors shoulder an additional burden, the duty to uphold
the law.8 7 If a doctor prescribes or administers a drug acceler-
ating a patient's death, he potentially comes within the scope of
the law of homicide.88 But such conduct would not always
amount to murder or manslaughter-or, for that matter, any
other criminal offense.8 9 In some circumstances the doctor's
conduct might not be regarded as a legally recognized cause of
death. Even if it were so regarded, the doctor would not usually
have the fault element of murder or manslaughter. 90
Murder and manslaughter have the same external ele-
ments; the difference between them lies in their different fault
elements. The external elements of these offenses involve caus-
ing the death of a fully born human being.91 Only acts "but for
which" death would not have occurred when it did can be re-
garded as a cause of death for the purpose of the law of homi-
cide. But, by no means, are all "but for" causes regarded as
imputable causes. The act may be treated as simply part of the
87 As members of civilized society, doctors are obliged to be law abiding and
honest. Furthermore, the Hippocratic Oath requires that doctors "[w]ith purity
and holiness.., will pass my life and practise my Art." THE HiPPocRATic OATH,
supra note 84.
88 See generally Adams, [1957] Crim. L.R., at 773; R. v. Lodwig Crim. L.R. -.
Dr. Lodwig was tried and acquitted on the basis of the use of a cocktail of drugs
including powerful painkillers and potassium chloride ("KCI"). It was accepted
that there was a therapeutic effect overall, even though the KC1 was simply a
poison. Id. See also R. v. Cox [1992] 12 B.M.L.R. 38. Dr. Cox was convicted of
attempted murder of a patient to whom he had administered a fatal dose of KCI.
The doctor's patient of eleven years was suffering debilitating pain and asked the
doctor for relief. The jury was deeply moved by the necessity of returning a guilty
verdict and Justice Ognall validated those sentiments by imposing a suspended
sentence. Id. See also Diana Brahams, Criminality and Compassion, LAw Soci-
ETY'S GAZErrE (London) Sept. 30, 1992 at 2 (subsequent decision of the General
Medical Council to take no further disciplinary action against Dr. Cox other than
its finding of professional misconduct also reflects the consensus view that the doc-
tor acted without malice).
89 For other offenses which sometimes apply to the prescription or administra-
tion of drugs hastening death see Offenses Against the Person Act 1861, § 18, 23,
24; Suicide Act 1961, § 2.
90 See Adams, [1957] Crim. L.R. 365.
91 See Offenses Against the Person Act 1861. See generally R. v. Cook [18981
62 J.P. 712; R. v. Instan [1893] 1 Q. B. 450, 454; 4 William Blackstone 188-190.
See also R. v. Crook [1859] 1 F. & F. 521, 523 (produced or accelerated).
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol10/iss2/6
PAIN MANAGEMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN
history,92 as a doctor's act would be if a patient were knocked
down and killed when crossing a road, which the patient would
not have been doing but for the doctor's request that he attend
the surgery.
There is no need for the act to be the sole, or even the main
cause of death. For the purpose of the law of homicide, it is
sufficient if the act is a cause, provided it is a cause "outside the
de minimis range, and effectively bearing upon the acceleration
of the moment of the victim's death."93 A person who intends to
kill, or who has no substantial doubt that his act will kill, has
the fault element for murder.94 If a doctor gave an injection for
the purpose of hastening death, or if he administered a drug
knowing it would have this effect, he would therefore be guilty
of murder if the patient died.
An intention to cause serious bodily harm is also, in most
circumstances, a sufficient fault element for murder. 95 The pos-
sible exception is where it would be lawful intentionally to
cause such harm. If a person intentionally causes serious bod-
ily harm in the course of using reasonable force in self-defense,
no problem would arise. If, in such instance, he were regarded
as having the fault element of murder, a well-established justi-
fication would be available to him. But where a doctor inten-
tionally causes serious bodily harm by performing an operation
to which consent has been given, and for which there is a good
reason, there could be difficulties if the doctor were regarded as
having the fault element for murder. Rather than provide a
separate justification, it might be convenient to say that as it
was lawful for the doctor to intend to cause serious bodily harm
in these circumstances, he is not to be regarded as having the
fault element for murder.96 However, where it is unlawful to
intentionally cause serious bodily harm, which is usually the
case, a person may be convicted of murder if he acts with this
92 See R. v. Smith [1959] 2 Q.B. 35, 43. See also R. v. Blaue [1975] 1 W.L.R.
1411, 1414-15; R. v. Malcherek [1981] 1 W.L.R. 690, 696.
93 R. v. Cato [19761 1 W.L.R. 110, 116. See also Malcherek, 1 W.L.R. at 696.
De minimis derives from the Latin term de minimis non curat lex translated "the
law is not concerned with trivial matters." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 297 (6th ed.
1991).
94 See Adams, [1957] Crim. L. R. 365.
95 See R. v. Cunningham [1982] A.C. 566.
96 See R. v. Hyam [1974] Q.B. 99, [19751 A.C. 55, 77D-79C.
1998]
19
PACE INT'L L. REV.
intention, and thereby hastens death. 97 There is no need to
prove that he knew that his act would endanger life.
In the leading case of R. v. Hyam, the trial judge directed
the jury that a person could be convicted of murder if, when
doing the act which led to the death, that person knew that it
was "highly probable" that death or serious bodily harm would
result.98 Doctors rarely take action believing that it is highly
probable that their act will hasten death. There are occasions,
however, when doctors act believing it is highly probable that
extremely serious bodily harm will follow, as well as other occa-
sions when they believe death or extremely serious bodily harm
is a probable or likely consequence. 99 If it is accepted that a
doctor would not have the fault element of murder if he acted
lawfully in intentionally causing really serious bodily harm,
then it follows that he would not have the fault element of mur-
der simply because he believed that really serious bodily harm
was a probable, or highly probable, consequence of his other-
wise lawful actions. But what of a case where a doctor inter-
venes, believing that it is probable that his conduct will hasten
the patient's death?
If a patient had a very serious heart condition, doctors
might consider it most unlikely that the patient would live for
another year if he did not have a heart transplant. Moreover,
the doctors might believe that if he had a transplant it is prob-
able that he would die earlier than if he did not have one, but
that there would be a significant possibility that the transplant
would be a success. If it were a success, the patient would live a
97 See id. at 101.
98 See id. The House of Lords dismissed the defendant's appeal, but in the
course of doing so raised the possibility of a defendant being convicted of murder
even though he did not desire that death or really serious bodily harm should en-
sue, and even though he did not believe that death or really serious bodily harm
was 'highly probable'. See id. Lord Hailsham and Lord Cross both delivered
speeches which indicated that in their opinion it was unnecessary for the trial
judge to have inserted the word 'highly', before 'probable', in his direction to the
jury. See id. See also R. v. Moloney [1985] 1 All E.R. 1025; R. v. Hancock [1986] 1
All E.R. 641; R. V. Nedrick [1986] 3 All E.R. 1 (people intend to kill or do serious
harm if they foresee that this is virtually certain to be the result of their actions).
99 See, e.g., R. v. Larkin [1943] K.B. 174; R. v. Church [1966] 1 Q.B. 59, D.P.P.
v. Newbury [19771 A.C. 500 (terms 'likely', 'serious risk', and 'dangerous' used in-
terchangeably in discussions of manslaughter). On foresight of probability and
foresight of possibility see La Fontaine v. R. [1976] 136 C.L.R. 62, R. v. Gush
[1980] 2 N.Z.L.R. 92.
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fuller and longer life than if he did not have a transplant. If the
patient consented to the operation under these circumstances
and the doctors proceeded without any problems, aside from the
fact that the patient does not survive the procedure, would they
have the fault element of murder?100 In Lord Hailsham's view,
expressed in the Hyam opinion, a person would not be guilty of
murder if he had a lawful excuse for exposing the deceased to
the risk of death. 101 He even recognized that the transplant
surgeon would not be liable even if he foresaw, as a high degree
of probability, that he would hasten the patient's death.10 2
R. v. Adams,10 3 decided in 1957, was the first case wherein
the high court addressed these issues. Adams was a doctor ac-
cused of deliberately increasing the dosage of opiates used as
pain relief in order to end patients lives.1° 4 The court summa-
rized the law stating:
If the first purpose of medicine-the restoration of health-
could no longer be achieved, there was still much for the doctor to
do, and he was entitled to do all that was proper and necessary to
relieve pain and suffering even if the measures he took might inci-
dentally shorten life by hours or even longer.10 5
Given this summation in their charge, the jury acquitted the
doctor. 106
This direction was based on the argument that in such
cases the doctor's actions would not cause death; death would
result from the illness itself.1 0 7 In addition, a second implicit
argument was that the doctor would lack the relevant criminal
100 See Hyam, [1975] A.C. at 74E-F, 77 C, G. Lord Hailsham did discuss this
example in his opinion. See id. He said that his own opinion corresponded with
that of the Commissioners on the Criminal Law, when they said that it ought to
make no difference in point of legal distinction whether death results from a direct
intention to kill, or from willfully doing an act of which death is the probable conse-
quence. See id.
101 See id. at 79B-C.
102 See id.
103 Adams, 11957] Crim. L.R. 365.
104 See P. DEVLIN, EASING THE PASSING: TRIAL OF DR. JOHN BODKIN ADAMS
(London, 1986). Apparently, the patients Dr. Adams over-medicated had left the
doctor money in their wills. See id.
105 Adams, [19571 Crim. L.R. 373.
106 See id.
107 See R. v. Bateman [1925] 19 Cr. App. R. 8.
19981 669
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intent. 108 If the intention was to relieve suffering then there
was a lawful excuse for the administration of the drugs despite
the incidental effect of shortening the patient's life. 10 9 While
this double effect principle may be criticized, it is unlikely that a
future judge would depart from this approach.
As recently as 1992, the court considered these issues and
employed the doctrine of double effect." 0 Dr. Cox was charged
with attempted murder by administering a lethal dose of potas-
sium chloride to a dying patient."' The court instructed the
jury to consider the doctor's purpose for taking such actions." 2
Expert evidence, however, showed that the drug administered
had no pain relieving properties and the dosage clearly would
have been fatal." 3 Dr. Cox chose not to testify on his own be-
half.114 Given that the jury convicted the doctor, it is arguable
that such expert evidence, when considered in relation to the
doctor's intent, showed the doctor's primary purpose was not to
relieve his patient's pain.
There is very little danger of a judge taking the view that a
doctor would be guilty of murder whenever he performed an act
hastening death, knowing that it was probable that it would
have this effect. The doctor would not be guilty where there
was a "lawful excuse" for exposing the patient to that risk."
5
Just as there is only one crime of murder, although it can be
committed with one of several mens rea, so there is only one
crime of manslaughter. It is, however, customary to speak of
manslaughter according to the mens rea concerned. The two
most important concepts to the issue here are "unlawful act""
' 6
and "negligent" 1 7 manslaughter.
108 See id.
109 See id.
110 See Cox, [19921 12 B.M.L.R. 38.
111 See id.
112 See id.
113 See MONTGOMERY, supra note 78, at 440.
114 See Cox, [1992] 12 B.M.L.R. 38.
115 See Hyam, [1975] A. C. 55, supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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"Unlawful act" manslaughter encompasses those instances
where death is caused by an unlawful act,11 which any reason-
able person would recognize as involving the danger of at least
some harm. 11 9 For instance, if a doctor carried out a risky non-
therapeutic experimental procedure, knowing that legally effec-
tive consent had not been given, he would have the fault ele-
ment for unlawful act manslaughter. If his conduct resulted in
the patient's death the doctor would be guilty of unlawful act
manslaughter, even though he did not believe that there was
any risk of death, and even though he performed the procedure
with the greatest care and competence.1 20
Negligent death happens when death occurs by defendant's
gross negligence.1 21 A defendant can be convicted even though
he was not aware that there was any risk to the deceased, but
the negligence must be so serious that the jury must regard it
as sufficient to warrant a conviction of manslaughter. 122 Where
death resulted from a doctor's extreme carelessness in prescrib-
ing a drug, the doctor could be regarded as guilty of negligent
manslaughter. 123
As seen in Adams and Cox, a doctor's reason for acting
sometimes affects his liability under the law of homicide.' 24 If a
patient died as a consequence of a very risky operation per-
formed in the hope of saving the patient's life, the heart trans-
plant patient for example, the doctor would not normally be
guilty of murder. 25 But, if death resulted from the doctor per-
forming an identical operation on a healthy person, for the sake
of an unnecessary research project, he would be liable. It is
clear, however, that the intent to alleviate suffering will not
provide a legal justification for a doctor who intentionally ad-
118 See R. v. Lamb [19671 2 Q.B. 981 (an act must be unlawful for some reason
other than that it is negligently performed).
119 See R. v. Church [1966] 1 Q.B. 59, 70.
120 See Hyam, [1975] A. C. 55.
121 See Bateman, [1925] 19 Cr. App. R. 8 (case involving a doctor). But see R. v.
Stone [1977] Q.B. 354.
122 See Andrews v. D.P.P. [1937] A. C. 583. On principal, negligence as to
death (or, at the very least, serious bodily harm) should be required as a pre-
requisite to conviction. But see Stone, [1977] Q. B. 354, 363.
123 See Andrews, [1937) A. C. 583.
124 See Adams, [1957] Crim. L.R. 365; Cox, [1992] 12 B.M.L.R. 38.
125 See Hyam, [19751 A. C. 55, supra note 96 and accompanying text.
19981
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ministers what he knows to be a lethal dose of a drug. 126 In R.
v. Arthur127 the court accepted that the doctor had acted from
the highest of motives, but directed the jury that "however no-
ble his motives were . . . that is irrelevant to the question of
your deciding what his intent was."'128 If a doctor acts with the
intention of bringing about the death of a patient, the fact that
he was acting to alleviate suffering, or for some other exemplary
motive, would not provide him with a defense to a charge of
murder. 129
In some circumstances, the fact that a person has particu-
lar medical qualifications will affect that person's liability for
murder or manslaughter. 130 Further, the fact that one was
medically qualified would make no difference if he administered
a drug, or took any other action intending to hasten the death of
a patient. 131 In the few cases where doctors were prosecuted for
murder or attempted murder due to action taken in the course
of treatment, trial judges have stressed that the law does not
place doctors in any special position.' 32
Even if a doctor acts in compliance with statements on
medical ethics propounded by the British Medical Association
(BMA), or any other organization, this does not of itself provide
a doctor with a defense to certain acts. If, for example, the doc-
tor administers a drug, or does any other act, for the purpose of
hastening the death of a patient,133 such compliance is not itself
a defense. Given this standard, a reasonable jury could find
126 See R. v. Arthur [1981] 283 BR. MED. J. 1340.
127 See id.
128 Id.
129 See Hyam, [1975] A.C. at 73.
130 See Adams, [1957] Crim. L.R. at 375. Justice Devlin said that the law was
the same for all: there was not any special defense for medical men. See id.
131 See Arthur, [1981] 283 Br. Med. J. 1340. Justice Farquharson stated there
"is no special law . . . that places doctors in a separate category and gives them
extra protection over the rest of us .... [they are] given no special power ... to
commit an act which causes death'. Id. at 1344.
132 See Adams, [1957] Crim. L.R. 365; Arthur, [1981] 283 Br. Med. J. 1340.
133 See Arthur, [1981] 283 Br. Med. J.1340. Justice Farquharson stated that it
was customary for professions to agree on rules of conduct for their members but
warned the jury that "that does not mean that any profession can set out a code of
ethics and say that the law must accept it and take notice of it." Id. Furthermore,
"whatever a profession may evolve as a system of standards of ethics, cannot stand
on its own, and cannot survive if it is in conflict with the law." Id.
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that a doctor committed murder even if they believe he acted in
accordance with the profession's ethical standards.
Beyond the crimes of murder and manslaughter, a doctor
may find himself subject to prosecution for the crime of assist-
ing suicide under the Suicide Act 1961.134 As mentioned ear-
lier, suicide has traditionally been held by the Christian
tradition as sinful 135 and until 1961 was a common law crime in
England. 136 Section 1 of the Act statutorily abolished the crime
of suicide and in turn the crime of attempting suicide. 137 Con-
sidering prosecution of one successfully completing the crime
was impossible and to prosecute someone for attempt did not
serve the victims' obvious psychological needs, Parliament
passed the Suicide Act.138
The removal of the common law crime was not intended to
be a rubber stamp approval of suicide, and to further make that
clear, section 2 of the Act creates the crime of assisting sui-
cide. 13 9 The elements of assisting a suicide are fulfilled when, a
person "aids, abets, counsels or procures the suicide of another,
or an attempt by another to commit suicide." 140 Despite thirty-
one convictions for assisting suicide made over a nine-year pe-
riod ending in 1991,141 there is still some confusion over what
exactly is required to establish the offense.
In A. G. v. Able, 142 the attorney General sought a declara-
tion that a booklet published by the Voluntary Euthanasia Soci-
ety (VES) was illegal under the Suicide Act. 143 The court held
134 See Suicide Act 1961, ch.60, § 2(1) (conviction of assisting suicide punish-
able by a maximum of fourteen years in prison).
135 See Crone, supra note 3. Thomas Cranmer (1489-1556), Archbishop of Can-
terbury and the most influential man in shaping the Church of England, said that
"self-murder was 'cursed of God, and damned forever.'" Id. at 23. See also Rev.
Richard E. Coleson, Contemporary Religious Viewpoints on Suicide, Physician-As-
sisted, and Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 7 (1996).
136 See Suicide Act 1961.
137 See id.
138 See Hodgson, supra note 14, at 189. See also Attorney General v. Able &
Others [1984] 1 All E. R. 277 (civil suit to determine the scope of the act).
139 See Suicide Act 1961 § 2.
140 See id. at § 2.
141 See K.J.M. Smith, Assisting Suicide-The Attorney-General and the Volun-
tary Euthanasia Society, CRIM. L.R. 579 (1983).
142 Able, [19841 1 All E.R. 277.
143 See id. The booklet at issue in this case began by indicating that the Soci-
ety disapproved of hasty decisions about suicide, but went on to describe a number
19981
25
PACE INT'L L. REV.
that, in order to prove the allegation, three things had to be
shown: (a) that the accused knew that suicide was contem-
plated, (b) that he or she approved or assented to it, and (c) that
he or she encouraged the suicide attempt.1 4 4 Here, publishing
the booklet was not necessarily illegal because the third ele-
ment was not established in relation to any specific death. 145
Consequently, giving someone pills and advising that they
should be taken to end his or her life would be an offense, 146 as
is directing someone to one who can help him or her commit
suicide. 147 An offense under section 2 may be committed even if
no actual attempt at suicide is made.i 48 A person who attempts
to encourage another to commit suicide can therefore be guilty
of attempted assisted suicide, even if the victim is
unsuccessful. 149
It is evident from this analysis that a health professional
who helps a patient to take his or her own life is likely to com-
mit a criminal offense. Even explaining how it might be done
will be illegal if the professional knows that it would encourage
the patient to go ahead. Making drugs available knowing that
the patient is likely to take a fatal overdose would also be a
crime. The conclusion is that the condition of the patient, the
doctor's high ethical motives, professional qualifications, or
compliance with accepted ethical standards would provide any
doctor with a defense when he/she prescribes or administers a
drug which hastens the death of the patient.
of ways in which "self-deliverance" might be achieved. See id. The Attorney Gen-
eral had evidence that the booklet was associated with at least fifteen cases of
suicide within eighteen months of its publication. See id. The argument was made
that the fact that the VES felt it necessary to discourage ill-considered suicides
indicated that it must have been aware of the risk that people might use the infor-
mation to commit suicide. See id. It was therefore contended that the VES was
committing the offense of assisting suicide under section 2 of the 1961 Act. See
Able, [1984] 1 All E. R. 277.
144 See id.
145 See id.
146 See R. v. McShane [1977] 66 Cr. App. R. 97.
147 See R. v. Reed [1982] Crim. LR 819, discussed in Able, [1983] 1 All E.R. at
286.
148 See Suicide Act of 1961.
149 See McShane, [19771 66 Cr. App. R. 97.
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C. Choose Your Weapon: An Overview of Controlled
Substance Regulations
It is widely accepted that if there were no other way to as-
suage pain, a doctor would be morally justified in administering
a pain-killing drug to a patient whose death was imminent,
even if he believed that the drug might have the incidental ef-
fect of hastening death. 150 But, would the doctor be guilty of
murder if the drug did hasten death? The question seems pre-
posterous. Yet, this question arises from the possibility that
any act hastening death may be regarded as a cause of death.
Moreover, a person can be convicted of murder even though he
did not desire to hasten death, and was not substantially cer-
tain that his conduct would have this effect. 151
It is almost certain that a doctor will not be prosecuted as a
result of his prescribing or administering a drug under these
circumstances. 152 Were there to be a prosecution, there would
be little danger of the jury convicting the doctor, whatever the
content of the judge's concluding remarks. Indeed, there would
be more than one way in which a judge could avoid directing the
jury that a doctor would be guilty of murder or manslaughter if
he administered a pain-killing drug to a patient whose death
was imminent, in the belief that the drug might well hasten
death.
Prior to examining these different possibilities, it is impor-
tant to examine the drugs concerned and the other than crimi-
nal controls on their use currently in place. The development,
150 See Patricia C. Crowley, No Pain, No Gain? The Agency for Health Care
Policy & Research's Attempt to Change Inefficient Health Care Practice of With-
holding Medication from Patients in Pain, 10 J. CON. H. L. & POLICY 383 (1994).
Crowley points out that "[t]he health care industry's current standard of care con-
cerning acute pain is to treat the pain retroactively as needed, rather than with
preventative measures. This practice has its foundation in two long-standing
myths of western culture. First, is that enduring pain develops character making
one a better, stronger and more moral person. Second, there is a fear that patients
will become addicted to drugs administered for pain relief." Id. See also Pain and
the Doctors, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1992 at A22 ("Stoicism is out the window").
151 See Hyam, [1975] A.C. 55.
152 Assuming that the patient was not opposed to the administration of the
drug, a common law battery, and was not given a greater quantity of it than could
reasonably be regarded as necessary to relieve pain. See generally Cox, [1992] 12
B.M.L.R. 38; Arthur, [1981] 283 BR. MED. J. 1340; Adams, [1957] Crim. L.R. 365;
Hyam, [1975] A.C. 55.
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manufacturing, distribution, and importation of medicines are
regulated under the Medicines Act 1968.153 Responsibility for
licensing drugs under the Act formally lies with the Secretary of
State for Health.154 In practice, the Medicines Control Agency,
part of the Department of Health exercises this authority. 155 As
part of the statutory framework, advice is available from the
Medicines Commission, whose members must have expertise in
medicine, pharmacy, non-pharmaceutical chemistry, and the
pharmaceutical industry.156 There are also a number of statu-
tory committees, including the Committee on Safety of
Medicines. Powers to enforce the provisions of the Medicines
Act 1968 lie with the Secretary of State, who has delegated
them concurrently to the Royal Pharmaceutical Society. 57
Various pieces of legislation introduce a number of provi-
sions aimed to ensure that medicines are used safely and for
licit purposes. The United Kingdom Central Council (UKCC)
has usefully categorized four stages in the therapeutic use of
medicines; prescription, dispensation, administration, and pa-
tient acceptance.' 58 The last is primarily regulated by the law
of consent.159 Administration is generally regulated by mal-
practice law.' 60 Certain controlled drugs may be administered
by or under the direction of medical and dental practitioners
only,' 6 ' but the actual administration is not restricted to profes-
sionals. 162 The dispensation stage covers the process by which
drugs are released for use, ceasing to be subject to any storage
requirements that applied. 63
Drugs are divided into a number of categories. 6 4 Under
the Medicines Act 1968, there is a threefold distinction between




157 See generally G. APPLEBE & J. WINGFIELD, DALE AND APPLEBE'S PHARMACY
LAW AND ETHICS 5TH ED. (London 1993).
158 See UNITED KINGDOM CENTRAL COUNCIL FOR NURSING, MIDWIFERY AND
HEALTH VISITING, Administration of Medicines (London: UKCC, 1986).
159 See MONTGOMERY, supra note 78, at ch. 10.
160 See id. at ch. 7.
161 See Misuse of Drugs Regulations 1985, SI 1985 No 2066, r. 7.
162 See id.
163 Storage requirements depend on the class of drug in question.
164 See Medicines Act 1968.
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(a) prescription-only medicines, (b) medicines that can only be
supplied by a pharmacist (but which can be dispensed without a
prescription), and (c) general-list medicines (which need not be
obtained through a pharmacist). 165 The Misuse of Drugs Act
1971, which is primarily concerned with control of illicit drug
use, contains three categories of controlled drugs, known as
classes A, B, and C.166 More importantly, for the health con-
text, controlled drugs are further classified by the Misuse of
Drugs Regulations 1985, which places them into one of five
schedules. 167 Schedule 1 drugs are not used for medicinal pur-
poses.168 Schedule 2 drugs include opiates and major stimu-
lants, such as amphetamines. 169 Schedule 3 drugs include most
barbiturates, and some minor stimulants. 170 Schedule 4 con-
tains benzodiazepine tranquilizers. 171 Schedule 5 contains
preparations of controlled drugs where there is minimal risk of
abuse. 172
Drugs from Schedules 2 and 3 can be dispensed only on pre-
scription.173 To be valid, a prescription has to be written in ink,
or some other indelible material, dated, and signed by the pre-
scriber.174 The name and address of the person for whom it is
prescribed must be set out together with the dosage to be
taken. 175 If the patient is under 12 years of age, his or her age
must also be recorded. 176 Where a controlled drug is prescribed,
the prescription must be personally handwritten by the pre-
scriber (otherwise it may be written by means of carbon pa-
per).177 Where a drug from Schedules 1, 2 or 3 of the Misuse of
165 See id.
166 See Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.
167 See Misuse of Drugs Regulations 1985.





173 See Medicines Order (Products other than Veterinary Drugs)(Prescription
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Drugs Regulations 1985 is prescribed, the dosage must be writ-
ten in both figures and words to avoid errors. 178
There are also requirements as to the storage of controlled
drugs and record keeping.'7 9 There must be a special register,
in the form of a bound book for controlled drugs in Schedules 1
and 2 of the 1985 regulations.' 80 An entry must be made every
time such a drug is obtained or supplied, recording the person
from whom it was obtained or to whom it was supplied, the
quantity involved, and the form in which the drug was trans-
ferred.18 ' Regulations on the safe custody of controlled drugs
apply to those in Schedules 1, 2, and 3.182 Such drugs must be
kept under lock and key.' 8 3
Regulation of the use of drugs centers on the legal power to
prescribe. The use of prescription-only drugs is not regulated
beyond the licensing system, which deals with the availability
of drugs on a general basis. Prescription-only medicines are re-
stricted to those patients that a health professional has identi-
fied as an appropriate recipient.184 Such medicines may be
dispensed only under a prescription, usually given only by a
medical doctor or dentist.'8 5 Limited provision has also been
made for nurses and practice nurses. 186 Midwives may possess
and use specified controlled drugs under a "midwives supply or-
der," which must be signed by a doctor or by the supervisor of
midwives.'8 7 Occupational health nurses may use prescription-
only medicines without immediate directions provided that they
do so only in circumstances specified in writing by a medical
practitioner.18 8 Certain district nurses and health visitors,
whose registration with the UKCC is annotated to show that
178 See Medicines Order (Products other than Veterinary Drugs)(Prescription
Only) 1983, SI 1983 No. 1212, as amended.






184 See Misuse of Drugs Regulations (Safe Custody) 1973, SI 1983 No 1212, as
amended.
185 See id.
186 See Medicines Act 1968, §58 and regulations promulgated thereunder.
187 See Medicines Order (Products other than Veterinary Drugs)(Prescription
Only) 1983, Sch. 3, Pts. I and III.
188 See id. at art. 9 and Sch.3, Pt. III, para. 5.
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they are qualified to do so, may prescribe drugs under a limited
formulary.18 9 Ambulance paramedics are also able to use cer-
tain prescription-only medicines. 190 Special restrictions exist
on the prescription of medicines to drug addicts.' 91
Finally, mention must be made of the use of unlicensed
products by doctors for individual patients. Under section 9 of
the Medicines Act, the usual licensing requirements are waived
where a doctor or dentist uses a drug specially prepared or im-
ported for a particular patient. 192 This is usually known as use
on a "named patient basis." 193 This enables the practitioner to
use drugs that have not yet been licensed, or to use licensed
drugs in a way that is not within the scope of the product li-
cense.' 94 This may mean use in a different form, dosage, or by a
different mode of administration. It may mean using the drug
for the patient falling outside the group for which the drug is
licensed (for example using the drug for children or pregnant
women when the drug has been licensed for non-pregnant
adults only). 195
D. The Proverbial Salt in the Wound: When Pain Relief
is Criminal
After examining the drugs concerned and the controls on
their use, it is possible to explore the ways a judge could avoid
directing the jury that a doctor would be guilty of murder or
manslaughter if he administered a pain-killing drug to a pa-
tient whose death was imminent, in the belief that the drug
might well hasten death. If a doctor prescribed a pain-killing
drug for the purpose of hastening the death of the patient, he
would have the fault element for murder. The dichotomy arises
where he simply believed that such treatment might well have
this effect.
The speeches in the House of Lords in R. v. Hyam raised
the possibility of someone being guilty of murder because he
189 See id. at art. 2, Sch. 1A.
190 See id. at Amendment No. 2 Order 1992.
191 See Misuse of Drugs Regulations (Notification of and Supply to Addicts)
1973, SI 1973 No. 799.
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knew that it was 'probable' or 'likely' (rather than highly prob-
able, or substantially certain) that his act would hasten
death. 196 Given the facts of that case, there was no need for
their Lordships to consider risk-taking in medical practice. 197
But, as previously mentioned, Lord Hailsham did discuss the
hypothetical heart transplant surgeon, arguing there was a
high degree of probability that such surgeon's actions would
hasten death and that such surgeon knew so at the time.198
Lord Hailsham stated that the surgeon would not be liable
when there was a lawful excuse for the conduct.199 If the court
gives the same effect to the statements made in Hyam support-
ing a very broad fault element for murder, one can expect it to
accept that the general statements must be qualified in some
way.
In the surgeon hypothetical, the court recognized that sur-
gery was the best or only means of securing the patient's sur-
vival. Even if length of life were the sole relevant consideration,
it could be argued that doctors would sometimes be justified in
prescribing or administering pain-killing drugs that may
hasten death. Such drugs can have the effect of prolonging life,
by improving the patient's capacity to sleep and eat.200 How-
ever, there is no reason to believe that length of life is the sole
consideration. A slight risk of death is inherent in many opera-
tions, which are performed to remedy conditions not themselves
endangering life. Where death is imminent, much greater risks
are justifiable to control pain.
There is not the least doubt it would be accepted that, if
there was no other clearly preferable way of relieving the pain
of a terminally ill patient, a doctor could properly prescribe or
administer a drug for that purpose. This is so even though the
doctor believed the drug might hasten death.20 1 As such risk-
taking would be regarded as justifiable, it would come within
the "lawful excuse" exception of Lord Hailsham's formulation of
196 See Hyam, [19751 A. C. 55, 74 E-F.




200 See AMERICAN COLLEGE OF LAW MEDICINE, supra note 8, at ch. 38.
201 This is assuming the patient is not known to be opposed to such treatment.
See ANNAS, supra note 14, at 218.
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the fault element for murder. Even if it were highly probable
that the drug would hasten death, the doctor should not be re-
garded as having a fault element sufficient for a conviction for
murder.
Manslaughter is more straightforward than murder. Un-
less the doctor acted in a way in which no reasonable doctor
would act,20 2 he would not have the fault element for negligent
manslaughter. Further, if the doctor did not commit some other
offense, he would not meet the requirements for the fault ele-
ment of 'unlawful act' manslaughter.
In terms of actual cause, it would often be extremely diffi-
cult to prove that a painkilling drug did hasten death. Some-
times such drugs will prolong life, by reducing debilitating
effects of severe pain. On the other hand, patients can die of
pneumonia whether or not they were given drugs that could
lead to respiratory complications. In other words, without
more, evidence of the use of such drugs is not dispositive of the
cause of death.
Even if it were apparent that the administration of the
pain-killing drug did accelerate death there is a strong possibil-
ity that the doctor's conduct would not be regarded as a cause of
death, for the purposes of the law of homicide. In relation to
most deaths there are innumerable acts "but for" which death
would not have occurred. The issue of whether a particular "but
for" cause is also an "imputable" cause, is often left to the jury
as a matter of common sense.20 3 But sometimes judges pro-
pound principles which lead to the conclusion that particular
conduct should, or should not, be regarded as a "cause" in the
eyes of the law.20 4 Both approaches played a part in Justice
Devlin's summation in Adams. 20 5 Several years following the
holding in Adams, Justice Devlin repeated portions of the jury
charge20 6 in a lecture before the Medical Society of London. 20 7
He further stated "[that] proper medical treatment consequent
upon illness or injury plays no part in legal causation [and that]
202 See AMERICAN COLLEGE OF LAW MEDICINE, supra note 8, at 119.
203 See H. Palmer, 'Dr. Adams' Trial for Murder [19571 CRIM. L.R. 365-77.
204 See id.
205 See id.
206 See Adams, [1957] Crim. L.R. 365. Specifically, Justice Devlin repeated the
language found herein at page 24, note 106. See id.
207 See P.D.G. SKEGG, LAW, ETHICS, AND MEDICINE 135 (Oxford, 1984).
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to relieve the pains of death is undoubtedly proper medical
treatment.
'208
Justice Farquharson, in R. v. Arthur, stated that there
comes a point when "the amount of those doses are such that in
themselves they will kill off the patient, but he is driven to it on
medical grounds."20 9 In such case, he feels, that a jury would
undoubtedly say "that could never be murder. That was a
proper practice of medicine." 210 Such a principle would lead to a
satisfactory result in relation to the administration of pain-kill-
ing drugs to a dying patient. Although the courts would have
the last word on the propriety of treatment, there could be no
doubt that their view would be similar to that summed up by
Justice Farquharson above.
There are objections to the adoption of a general principle
whereby nothing which could be described as proper medical
treatment could be regarded as a "cause" for legal purposes.
But in view of the lead given by Justice Devlin in R. v. Adams, it
is likely, in any future case involving the prescription or admin-
istration of a drug to relieve the pains of death, a judge would be
prepared to manipulate the concept of causation to avoid the
conclusion that the doctor's act was the legal cause of death.
VI. CONCLUSION
Across the board, governments face unique challenges in
balancing the rights of an individual to be free from pain
against the state's right to protect individuals from harm, such
as the slippery slope we saw in the Netherlands experiment. In
looking to the standards adopted by Great Britain, the develop-
ment and implementation of common law and statutory
schemes including criminalization and regulation, the inter-
ested parties in the United States may recognize a blue print to
follow. While the criminal law is merely one lens through
which to view this problem, to the health practitioners subject
to those prosecutions, it is the most consequential. Not only
must we recognize that, if convicted and sentenced to prison, a
208 See id.
209 Arthur, [1981] 283 BR. MED. J. 1340.
210 LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, EUTHANASIA, AIDING SUICIDE AND
CESSATION OF TREATMENT 70 (1982).
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doctor's license, reputation-livelihood-is at stake in these
matters. Indeed, a doctor's very freedom is at stake.
The issues of pain management and PAS implicate the law
in numerous and diverse ways. For example, in countries, such
as Great Britain, supporting nationalized heath care systems,
the regulation of controlled substances not only includes the
protection and sanctity of human life, but also the more base
issue of economics. Even in countries where health care is
"free," so to speak, there must be limits on these expensive and
limited treatments. The government must determine who is to
get what benefit and at what point in their treatment. Further-
more, constituents demand appropriations for preventive or
palliative care in addition to demands for everyday treat-
ment. 211 Insurance law and medical practice acts must weigh
these financial concerns in trying to balance the substantial in-
terests on both sides.
The principles of British criminal law considered herein in-
dicate that the administration of drugs that hasten death would
be lawful providing that three tests are satisfied. First, the pa-
tient must be terminally ill. It is unclear how close to death the
patient need be, and this is not always known with any cer-
tainty. However, the patient must already be dying if it is to be
argued that the illness, not the drugs was the cause of death.
Second, prescribing the drugs must be "the right and proper
treatment." This appears to mean that it must be treatment
accepted as proper by a responsible body of the profession. In
1990, a prosecution against a doctor was dropped when it be-
came apparent that some doctors supported the use of the drugs
administered, despite the fact that the predominant opinion
was that they were inappropriate. 212 Third, the motivation for
211 See First Ever Hospice/Palliative Care Summit in Canada, CANADA NEWS
WIRE, Monday, Nov. 10, 1997. "Demand for hospice and palliative care is growing
rapidly," says Linda Lysne, Executive Director, Canadian Palliative Care Associa-
tion. "We want and need to see hospice and palliative care gain more prominence
in our healthcare system." Id. See also Taking Better Care of the Dying, ABA
JOURNAL, Sept. 1997 at 51.
212 See Doctor is Cleared of Murdering Patient, THE INDEPENDENT Mar. 16,
1990. See also PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE, at <Http://www.netlink.co.uklusers/
vess/mclean.html> (visited, Oct. 4, 1997). A survey performed by Sheila McLean,
Professor of Law & Ethics in Medicine at Glasgow University on a grant from the
Voluntary Euthanasia Society of Scotland, revealed that a majority of doctors in
Britain believed they should be allowed to help suffering patients die. See id. The
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prescribing the drugs must be to relieve suffering. Otherwise
the shortening of the patient's life would not be "incidental" to




MODEL STATUTE ON IMMUNITY FOR EFFECTIVE PAIN RELIEF
Short Title
§ 1. This Act may be cited as the Pain Relief Act.
Definitions
§ 2. For the purposes of this Act:
1. "Board" means [insert the appropriate list of state licensure
boards that govern doctors, nurses, physician assistants
and pharmacists].
2. "Physician" means a licensee of the [insert the name of the
board or boards licensing M.D.s and D.O.s].
3. "Nurse" means a licensee of the [insert the name of the
state board of nursing].
4. "Pharmacist" means a licensee of the [insert the name of
the state board of pharmacy].
5. "Physician Assistant" means a licensee of the [insert the
name of the state board regulating physician assistants].
survey, released on May 23, 1997 was the first of its kind in Britain. See id. The
results are as follows: 54% of doctors responding would support a change in the
law which would allow them to help patients die. See id. Of those, 16% said they
would help in terminal cases, 11% in cases of physical suffering, and 7% simply if
the patient wished. See id. Notably, of those admitting that patients have asked
for such help, 3% have complied with the patient's request. See id.
t 1999 J.D./M.P.A. Candidate, Pace University School of Law and the Dyson
College of Arts and Sciences. The author would like to thank Joseph Ryan, Ph.D.
for his encouragement and invaluable comments on this article and Joseph Deer
for his constant love and support.
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6. "Intractable pain" is a state of pain, even if temporary, in
which reasonable efforts to remove or remedy the cause of
the pain have failed or have proven inadequate.
7. "Clinical expert" is one who by reason of specialized educa-
tion or relevant experience has knowledge regarding cur-
rent standards and guidelines for pain management.
8. "Accepted practice/care guidelines for pain management"
are guidelines for pain management developed by nation-
ally recognized clinical or professional associations; spe-
cialty societies or government-sponsored agencies that have
actively researched pain management and thus developed
practice/care guidelines. In the absence of current accepted
practice/care guidelines, rules or policies issued by the Bard
may serve the function of such guidelines as described in
§ 3 of this Act. Guidelines established for the purposes of
coverage, payment or reimbursement do not qualify as "ac-
cepted practice/care guidelines for pain management: when
offered to limit treatment options otherwise covered within
this Act.
9. "Therapeutic purpose" is the use of pharmaceutical and
non-pharmaceutical medical treatments that conforms to
accepted practice/care guidelines for pain management.
10. "Disciplinary action" includes formal, informal, remedial or
punitive actions taken by a board against a health care
provider.
11. "Health care provider" is a licensed physician, nurse, physi-
cian assistant or pharmacist as defined in subsections 2,3,4
and 5 of this section.
§3
1. A physician, nurse, physician assistant or pharmacist who
prescribes, dispenses or administers medical treatment for
the therapeutic purpose of relieving intractable pain shall be
immune from criminal prosecution and disciplinary action
unless it can be established by clinical expert testimony that
the health care provider did not substantially comply with
accepted practice/care guidelines for pain management.
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2. The provisions of subsection 1 of this section shall apply to
physicians, nurses, physician assistants and pharmacists in
the treatment of all patients for intractable pain regardless
of the patient's prior or current chemical dependency. The
Board may develop and issue rules, policies or guidelines es-
tablishing standards and procedures for the application of
this Act to the care and treatment of chemically dependent
individuals, consistent with the provisions of this Section of
the Act.
3. Nothing in this section shall deny the authority of the Board
to discipline a health care provider who:
a. fails to maintain complete, accurate and current medical
records documenting the physical examination and medi-
cal history of the patient, the basis for the diagnosis of the
patient and the treatment plan for the patient;
b. writes false or fictitious prescriptions for controlled sub-
stances scheduled in the Federal Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. 801
et seq. [or related statute];
c. prescribes or administers or dispenses pharmaceuticals in
violation of the provisions of the Federal Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C
801 et seq. [or related statute];
d. or who self-prescribes or self-administers pharmaceuti-
cals in violation of current professional standards.
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